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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Furman Case: What Life Is Left in the Death Penalty?
On June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme Court announced a dramatic,
far-reaching, and highly controversial decision in the case of Furman v.
Georgia,' which declared the current application of capital punishment to be
a violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments."' 2  The immediate impact of the decision was to strike down
virtually all provisions in the state and federal statutes which allow the im-
position of the death penalty3 and to spare the lives of 631 convicted crimi-
nals then awaiting execution. 4
However, the decision was by no means clear as to the viability of capital
punishment in American criminal law. In a manner befitting the serious
and controversial nature of the topic, all nine justices filed separate opinions
totaling 232 pages, and only reached a consensus by a bare 5-4 majority. A
composite of the five majority opinions yields one point of agreement: the
death penalty as currently imposed at the discretion of juries is a cruel and
unusual punishment for a variety of reasons. Left unresolved are the ques-
tions whether capital punishment is per se unconstitutional or whether the
present system could be cured to preserve the death penalty.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court actually consolidated three cases for consid-
eration: Furman v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969) (petitioner con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death under GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp.
1971) ); Jackson v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969) (petitioner con-
victed of rape and sentenced to death pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp.
1971) ); and Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1969) (petitioner
convicted of rape and sentenced to death under TEx. PENAL CODE, art. 1189 (1961) ).
2. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
3. Because the decision reaches only those laws making the death penalty a dis-
cretionary choice for juries, four statutes imposing mandatory death penalties are un-
effected: 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1959) (spying for the enemy in wartime), MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN., ch. 265 § 2 (1970) (murder during the commission of a forcible rape),
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 8901.09-10 (1954) (assassin of a President of the United
States or the Governor of a State), and R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (1957) (life
term prisoner who commits murder in prison).
4. TIME, Death Rattles, November 20, 1972, at 74.
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The purpose of this article is to attempt to clarify the positions taken and
the reasoning employed by the various justices, with an eye to the future res-
olution of the unanswered questions.
Background
The Court's decision in Furman culminates years of intense debate and
speculation over the constitutionality of the death penalty; speculation strong
enough to bring about a moratorium on criminal executions during the last
five years while several defendants manuevered to get their cases before the
Supreme Court to test various constitutional arguments. 5 Prior to Furman,
the Supreme Court had never directly ruled upon the constitutionality of the
death penalty under the eighth amendment,6 although some passing refer-
ences have been made to the issue in earlier cases. In fact, the Court has
measured criminal punishments against the cruel and unusual punishment
clause on only ten occasions, 7 while finding only three to be violations.8 It
must be noted, however, that not until 1962 did the Court definitely deter-
mine that the eighth amendment was applicable to the States through the
fourteenth amendment.9
The Court's first confrontation with the clause came in Wilkerson v. Utah10
in 1878, where the Court concluded that publicly shooting a convicted mur-
derer did not inflict unnecessary pain and, therefore, the method of execution
was not cruel." Twelve years later, in the case of In re Kemmler,12 the
5. In Furman, Justice Powell points out in dissent:
Petitioners concede, as they must, that little weight can be given to lack of
executions in recent years. A de facto moratorium has existed for five years
now while cases challenging the procedures for implementing the capital sen-
tence have been re-examined by this Court. McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The infre-
quency of executions during the years before the moratorium became fully
effective may be attributable in part to decisions of this Court giving ex-
panded scope to the criminal procedural protections of the Bill of Rights, es-
pecially under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. E.g. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
408 U.S. at 435 n.18.
6. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The Court heard arguments
on the issue, but decided the case on other grounds.
7. For a complete list of cases see Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death
Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1773, 1777 n.17 [hereinafter referred to
as Goldberg].
8. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (criminal punishment for the
status of narcotics addiction); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (criminal penalty of
expatriation per se unconstitutional); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910) (fifteen years hard labor in chains plus other civil penalties for falsifying a
public record.).
9. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
10. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
11. Id. at 136. The Court raised the eighth amendment issue on its own. In dic-
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Court refused to hold that electrocution, then a novel form of execution, was
cruel and unusual punishment under the constitution of the State of New
York. In denying an application for a writ of error, the Court determined
from the evidence that electrocution was an instantaneous and painless
mode of execution,' s therefore not "cruel" in the intended meaning of the
constitutional term. 14
Weems v. United States15 marked the first time the Court struck down a
sentence under the cruel and unusual punishment clause. The Court va-
cated a judgment which sentenced a defendant, convicted of falsifying a pub-
lic record, to 15 years at hard labor, the permanent loss of civil liberties, and
a fine. Expanding the concept of "unnecessary cruelty" drawn from Wilker-
son and Kemmler, the Court held the sentence "excessive." 1  Weems
marked a turning point in the Court's view of its role in construing "cruel and
unusual" punishments. The principle of "excessiveness" was applied both to
the proportionality between crime and punishment and to the severity of the
penalty necessary to achieve the proper purpose of punishment.'
7
In Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber'5 the Court upheld the Louisiana
Supreme Court's denial of writs filed on behalf of a defendant whose elec-
trocution was prevented by a mechanical failure. By a 5-4 vote the Court
rejected arguments that a subsequent electrocution would be an emotional
torture and contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 19
turn the Court defined "cruel and unusual punishments" as tortures and "all others in
the same line of unnecessary cruelty." Id.
In his dissenting opinion in Furman, Chief Justice Burger objected to the majority's
lifting the terms "unnecessary cruelty" and "excessiveness" out of context from
Wilkerson and Weems. He contended the original meaning of such terms was limited
to the particular punishment's relation to the crime, and were not meant to imply au-
thority for the Court's evaluation of the efficacy of a punishment in relation to the
achievement of penal aims. 408 U.S. at 392.
12. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
13. Id. at 441-44.
14. Id. at 447. "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the Constitution. It implies something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life." Id.
15. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
16. Id. at 362-67. See also Goldberg, supra note 7, at 1795.
17. 408 U.S. at 280 (Brennan opinion). "Mr. Justice Field apparently based his
conclusion (in Weems) upon an intuitive sense that the punishment was disproportion-
ate to the criminal's moral guilt, although he also observed that 'the punishment was
greatly beyond anything required by any humane law for the offenses.'" Id. n.24.
18. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
19. Id. at 464. The Court determined that the method of execution was not inher-
ently cruel, and incidental mental suffering was not within the protection of the
amendment.
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In Trop v. Dulles20 the Court reversed a sentence of expatriation imposed
upon a convicted deserter by a military general court-martial. 21 Picking up
the developmental approach where it left off in Weems, the Court stated the
cruel and unusual punishment clause was not a static feature of the Consti-
tution but "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 22  The Court held such
alienation of the deserter did not qualify as "civilized treatment guaranteed
by the Eighth Amendment. '2 3  In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Bren-
nan expressed his belief that the penalty was extremely harsh and bore ques-
tionable relation to the recognized legitimate penal objectives of deterrence,
social isolation and rehabilitation. 24  In dicta, however, the Court indicated
that capital punishment, per se, could not be found cruel given its historical
acceptance.25
More recently, the Court, in Robinson v. California,26 struck down a 90-
day jail sentence for violation of a California statute making it a crime to "be
addicted to the use of narcotics." The Court had little trouble finding the
punishment "excessive" in light of the fact that they viewed drug addiction as
more an illness than a crime. 27 However, in 1968, in Powell v. Texas,28 the
Court upheld a $20 fine levied against a defendant charged with public
drunkenness. A 5-4 majority refused to extend the Robinson principle be-
cause it found insufficient evidence to equate alcoholism and drug addition,
and because the punishment was not based solely upon the defendant's phys-
ical status.
Two other recent cases are important. In Witherspoon v. Illinois29 and
20. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
21. Four Justices in Trop agreed that loss of citizenship constituted "cruel and
unusual punishment." Mr. Justice Brennan swung the case in favor of the petitioner
but by concluding that Congress lacked the legislative power to authorize such depri-
vations by statute.
22. 356 U.S. at 101. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)
(constitutional protection expands as "public opinion becomes enlightened by human
justice.")
23. 356 U.S. at 99.
24. ld. at 110-14.
25. "Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral
grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are
forceful-the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and in a day
when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept
of cruelty. But it is equally plain that the existence of the death penalty is not a
license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of
its imagination." Id. at 99.
26. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
27. Id. at 666.
28. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
29. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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McGautha v. California30 the Court considered arguments that the rejection
of prospective jurors who opposed the death penalty in capital cases31 and
the lack of standards to guide juries in the infliction of death penalties vio-
lated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. After much con-
sideration, the Court found in both cases that complete and unfettered jury
discretion was not only a responsible, but a necessary element in maintaining
a "link between contemporary community values and the penal system-a
link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing so-
ciety'.",32
The most significant development occurred in early 1972 when the Calif-
ornia Supreme Court, in People v. Anderson,33 declared the state's death
penalty to be in violation of the state's constitutional proscription against
"cruel or unusual punishment". 34  The defendant was sentenced to die fol-
lowing conviction for first degree murder.35 In a dramatic reversal the Cal-
ifornia high court rejected the presumption of the death penalty's validity
through historical acceptance and declared it now so offensive to contem-
porary standards of decency as to be cruel and unusual.3 6 The court
stated contemporary standards are to be measured by the will of informed
citizens, not by public opinion polls. 37 In the court's opinion the fact that
jurors called upon to impose the death penalty were increasingly reluctant to
30. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
31. The Witherspoon Court held that "a sentence of death cannot be carried out if
the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for
cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." 391 U.S. at 522.
32. 391 U.S. at 519 n.15: "In light of history, experience and the present limita-
tions of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases
is offensive to anything in the Constitution." 402 U.S. at 207.
33. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (1972).
34. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be in-
flicted." (Emphasis added)
Commentators have pointed out that the disjunctive wording in the California con-
stitution is of no significant difference from that of the United States Constitution.
In any case, the California court held capital punishment to be both cruel and
unusual, though expressly declining to consider the issue in light of the eighth amend-
ment because Furman was before the United States Supreme Court at the time. See
Comment, Cruel or Unusual Punishment: The Death Penalty, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1045, 1047-48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Suffolk Comment].
35. The defendant was granted a new trial on the punishment issue in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Witherspoon that jurors could not be excluded on the
basis of general or conscientious objections to capital punishment. A second jury
again imposed the death penalty. 6 Cal. 3d at 633, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55, 493 P.2d
at 883.
36. 6 Cal. 3d at 656, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171, 493 P.2d at 899.
37. 6 Cal. 3d at 649, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 166 _493 P.2d at 893-94. See also Suf-
folk Comment, supra note 34, at 1047.
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utilize capital punishment indicated strong social disfavor.38
Furman v. Georgia
It was in the context of the above-mentioned prior decisions that the Supreme
Court reviewed the death sentences imposed by Georgia juries upon Fur-
man8" and Jackson,40 as well as that imposed by a Texas jury upon
Branch. 41 To understand the basis for the majority's coalition it is necessary
to examine separately the reasoning used by the individual Justices.
Justices Brennan and Marshall devoted considerable space to historical in-
terpretations of the language of the eighth amendment 42 and to the history
of the death penalty in Anglo-American law. 48 Both Justices concluded
that the death penalty, despite its long historical acceptance, could become
cruel and unusual if contrary to contemporary moral standards; that no prior
case law had directly held capital punishment compatible with the eighth
amendment; that, in any case, the nature of the eighth amendment obligated
the judiciary to review certain legislative penalties in the light of their most
objective interpretation of contemporary moral standards; and that, in fact,
capital punishment per se violated present day standards.
Mr. Justice Brennan determined that the fundamental purpose behind the
cruel and unusual punishment clause was the preservation of human dig-
nity.44 He distilled four principles out of prior eighth amendment cases by
which to test any punishment: degradation to human dignity, arbitrary im-
position, offensiveness to contemporary moral standards, and excessiveness
in relation to the crime or penal purpose. He found, in light of his under-
standing of contemporary society, that capital punishment violated all four
principles.
Brennan reasoned that the enormity and severity of the death penalty by
its irrevocable nature was uniquely degrading to human dignity and a denial
38. Id. "The steady decrease in the number of executions . . . in spite of a growing
population and notwithstanding the statutory sanction of the death penalty, persua-
sively demonstrates that capital punishment is unacceptable to society today." Id.
39. William Furman was convicted of murder for fatally shooting the occupant of
a house who discovered Furman breaking into his home early one morning.
40. Lucious Jackson was convicted of forcibly raping his victim while holding a
pair of scissors to her throat during the course of a robbery.
41. Elmer Branch was convicted of forcibly raping a 65 year old woman in her
home, without the use of a weapon but with physical force and intimidating threats.
42. See 408 U.S. at 260-69 (Brennan opinion); id. at 316-33 (Marshall opinion).
43. Id. at 333-42 (Marshall opinion).
44. "At bottom, then, the . . . Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and in-
human punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with re-
spect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is 'cruel and unusual,'
therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity." Id. at 270.
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by society of the individual's existence as a member of the human commu-
nity.45 He also concluded that the death penalty has been arbitrarily in-
flicted46 and offered statistics to show the great reduction in the number of
death sentences imposed and the rare incidence of those convicted of capital
crimes actually being executed over the last four decades.47  He believed
that the statistics raised a presumption of arbitrariness which was not over-
come by the claim that capital punishment is used "selectively," since no ra-
tional basis was offered for distinguishing between those capital offenders
who live and those who die. To the contrary, he claimed, the meaning of
McGautha was that juries are to be "wholly unguided by standards govern-
ing that decision."'4
Drawing upon the extensive analysis of the death penalty's history written
by Mr. Justice Marshall, 49 Brennan contended "[t]he progressive decline
in, and the current rarity of, the infliction of death demonstrate that our so-
ciety seriously questions the appropriateness of this punishment today."50
Finally, Brennan concluded, the death penalty is excessive because it has
been proven unnecessary or ineffective in furthering legitimate penal aims.
Again citing Marshall's statistics,5' Brennan found no conclusive evidence
that the death penalty is any more effective a deterrent to crime than life im-
prisonment, although admittedly a more severe punishment. Nor, Brennan
45. 408 U.S. at 289. Brennan likens capital punishment to expatriation which was
struck down in Trop as "a form of punishment more primitive than torture ... " in
that it was "the loss of the right to have rights." 356 U.S. at 101-02.
46. Although little attention has been given to the term "unusual" by itself, some
courts have alluded to it as a concept closely related to "arbitrariness." See Goldberg,
supra note 7, at 1791, "The Court in Francis did make reference to the "[pirobibition
against the wanton infliction of pain . . .which suggests that the proscription of un-
usual punishment extends to wanton as well as arbitrary imposition of severe penalties."
47. Data cited from National Prisoner Statistics No. 46, Capital Punishment 1930-
70. 408 U.S. at 291-93 and accompanying footnotes.
48. Id. at 295.
49. Justice Marshall's analysis brought to light the succession of popular move-
ments in America since colonial times and their various degrees of success in abolish-
ing capital punishment. The result is that nine states presently have outlawed the
death penalty and all of the others have greatly reduced the number of crimes punish-
able by death over the years to a few of the most serious.
50. 408 U.S. at 299.
51. Justice Marshall's figures, for the most part, were taken from T. SELLIN, THE
DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE (A.L.I.) 5 (1959).
Sellin's statistics indicate no correlation between the murder rate and the presence or
absence of capital punishment, that the abolition or reintroduction of capital punishment
has no effect on homicide rates, nor is a greater deterrent effect apparent even in those
communities where executions are carried out. 408 U.S. at 348-51. On the other
hand, Marshall cites some evidence to the effect that the use of the death penalty may
even encourage certain psychologically disturbed persons to commit capital crimes.
Id. at 351 n.113.
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found, even assuming retribution to be a legitimate penal purpose, 5'2 can the
argument stand that those who commit the most heinious crimes deserve to
die. The scarcity of statutes imposing mandatory death sentences indicated
to him that legislatures have not found it necessary that any criminal must
die, no matter how despicable his crime. 53
In the light of these four principles Brennan declared the death penalty
"cruel and unusual" and no longer justified. Mr. Justice Marshall joined
him in advocating the total abolition of capital punishment and, although his
opinion in effect covers much of the same ground as did Brennan's, Marshall
addressed himself to several other issues.
Marshall was conscious of the fact that judicial restraint cautioned him
against striking down such a long-standing practice as capital punishment
and invading the legislative realm to do so. With regard to prior case law
he stated, "There is no holding directly in point, and the very nature of the
eighth amendment would dictate that unless a very recent decision existed,
stare decisis would bow to changing values, and the question of the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment at any given moment in history would remain
open."' 54 And after examining the history of popular movements to abolish
or limit the use of the death penalty, he justified his invasion of legislative
prerogative by stating:
"[i]t is not improper at this point to take judicial notice of the fact
that for more than 200 years men have labored to demonstrate that
capital punishment serves no purpose that life imprisonment could
not serve equally well. And they have done so with great success.
Little, if any, evidence has been adduced to the contrary. The
point has now been reached at which deferrence to the legislatures is
tantamount to abdication of our judicial roles as factfinders,
judges, and ultimate arbiters of the Constitution. We know that at
some point the presumption of constitutionality accorded legislative
acts gives way to a realistic assessment of those acts. This point
comes when there is sufficient evidence available so that judges can
determine, not whether the legislature acted wisely, but whether it
had any rational basis whatsoever for acting." 5
Marshall found the evidence overwhelming that capital punishment is
"excessive" and in violation of the eighth amendment.
52. Justice Brennan did not believe "naked vengeance" to be a legitimate penal pur-
pose. "As the history of the punishment of death in this country shows, our society
wishes to prevent crime; we have no desire to kill criminals simply to get even with
them." Id. at 305.
53. Id. at 304, "When the overwhelming number of criminals who commit capital
crimes go to prison, it can not be concluded that death serves the purpose of retribution
more effectively than imprisonment. The asserted public belief that murderers and
rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent with the execution of a random few."
54. Id. at 330.
55. Id. at 359.
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In addition to finding current sentencing practices to be arbitrary, Mar-
shall found reason to believe they had proved discriminatory, an issue which
was the core of Justice Douglas' concurring opinion. Judging by the dispro-
portionate numbers of Negroes that have been executed as compared with
their percentage in the general population and in the crime rate,56 Marshall
was led to believe that the McGautha rationale constituted "an open invita-
tion to discrimination." 57
Aside from dispelling the myth that the death penalty is a more effective
deterrent than life imprisonment, Marshall produced evidence that murder-
ers, the primary class of capital offenders, have proven to have a much lower
incidence of recidivism than other criminals, 58 and that legislatures have
demonstrated recidivism is not of such major concern to make the death
penalty mandatory or to make it a consideration for juries in choosing which
criminals to sentence to death.
Marshall agreed with Brennan that the compatibility of capital punish-
ment with contemporary moral standards is not properly reflected by public
opinion polls. He concluded only that if the average citizen were confronted
with the evidence before the Court, he would surely agree the death penalty
is not only unwise, but immoral and unconstitutional.5 9
Justices Douglas, White and Stewart concurred in striking down the death
penalty, but they restricted themselves to a much narrower issue. They
found it inappropriate to reach the ultimate question of whether capital pun-
ishment per se is unconstitutional. Instead they confined their arguments
to the death penalty as it was applied in the three cases before them, namely
at the juries' discretion.
56. See Id. at 364 and accompanying footnotes for statistics. In dissent, Justice
Powell discounted the value of the older statistics regarding racial discrimination
since "the segregation of our society in decades past, which contributed substantially to
the severity of punishment for interracial crimes, is now no longer prevalent in this
country. Likewise, the day is past when juries do not represent the minority group ele-
ments of the community." Id. at 450.
57. Id. at 365. "It is also evident that the burden of capital punishment falls upon
the poor, the ignorant and the underprivileged members of the society . . .who are
least able to voice their complaints against capital punishment." Id. at 365-66.
Justice Marshall contended the death penalty has been retained largely due to public
ignorance or apathy as to its actual effect. Id. at 365-66, 369.
To the contrary, Justice Powell finds it quite natural that the death penalty falls
heaviest upon the "have-nots" of society as do almost all criminal punishments. But he
holds this to be the result of socio-economic factors which cannot be elevated to
eighth amendment proportions. Id. at 447.
58. Statistics tend to show murderers are extremely unlikely to commit other crimes
either in prison or upon release. For the most part they are first offenders, and when
released from prison they are known to become model citizens. id. at 355. See also
B. ESHELMAN and F. RILEY, DEATH Row CHAPLAIN 224 (1962).
59. 408 U.S. at 363.
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Justice Douglas admitted the difficulty in declaring such a long-standing
penalty suddenly "cruel". However, he read the history of the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause to reflect a strong "equal protection" considera-
tion; 60 not only to prevent unnecessarily cruel penalties but also to prevent
the selective or irregular application of penalties, especially directed against
minority groups. For this reason Douglas believed the mere evaluation of
the language of a statutory punishment was insufficient; "[w]hat may be
said of the validity of the law on the books and what may be done with the
law on its application do or may lead to quite different conclusions."' 61 De-
claring jury discretion to be the constitutional defect in the current use of
capital punishment, he blamed the McGautha decision. "We are now im-
prisoned in the McGautha holding. Indeed the seeds of the present cases
are in McGautha. Juries (or judges, as the case may be) have practically
untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die."'62
Douglas found that vulnerable minorities have most often been the target
for capital punishment in the past and that today the penalty is still selec-
tively applied to unpopular minorities, as well as to the ignorant and the
poor, who do not or can not retain qualified legal counsel.6 3 "The high ser-
vice rendered by the 'cruel and unusual' punishment clause . . . is to require
legislature to write penal laws that are even-handed, nonselective, and non-
arbitrary and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied
sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups." 6 4  Douglas con-
cluded that the present capital punishment statutes based on jury descretion
are "pregnant with discrimination" and must fall.
60. Id. at 249. Justice Douglas finds "the principle of equal protection implicit" in
the language of the English Bill of Rights which spawned the Eighth Amendment. Id.
at 240. See also Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 845-46 (1969).
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger objected to Justice Douglas' raising essentially an
equal protection argument when the grant of certiorari in this case was limited to the
eighth amendment issue distinct from any equal protection claim. "Evidence of a
discriminatory pattern of enforcement does not imply that any use of a particular
punishment is so morally repugnant as to violate the eighth amendment." Id. at 390
n.12.
61. Id. at 242.
62. Id. at 248. Justice Douglas reiterated his dissent in McGautha, and questioned
why the same evidence of arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing relied on by the ma-
jority in the present case was not sufficient to strike down jury discretion under the due
process attack in McGautha. Id n.11.
63. 408 U.S. at 250. Justice Douglas cited Koeninger, Capital Punishment in
Texas, 1927-1968, 15 CRIM. & DELIN. 132, 141 (1969) (study concludes that the poor,
the young and the ignorant bear a disproportionate share of the death sentences in
Texas), and BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 474 (1967 rev. ed.) (a dispropor-
tionate number of blacks sentenced and executed.) Contra, see Justice Powell's re-
buttal noted in footnotes 56 and 57.
64. 408 U.S. at 256.
[Vol. 22:651
Death Penalty
Justices Stewart and White likewise considered only the constitutionality of
discretionarily imposed death sentences. Both concluded, in short opinions,
that such a sentencing system had resulted in at least such arbitrary and in-
frequent use of the death penalty as to violate the proscription against cruel
and unusual punishments.
Justice Stewart noted that the discretionary application of capital punish-
ment was an admission by legislatures that it was not a necessary punish-
ment, though far more "cruel" than the alternative of life imprisonment.
Although willing to admit retribution is a valid consideration of social jus-
tice, he found that the infrequency of infliction renders death an "unusual
punishment and, further, that those selected to die constitute a "capricously
selected random handful". He concluded that the eighth amendment can-
not tolerate so unique a penalty "to be so wantonly and so freakishly im-
posed".05
Justice White agreed, finding the death penalty so rare as to have lost any
deterrent value it might once have had. He, too, believed such an infre-
quently applied punishment is of doubtful use in satisfying any general need
of justice. He did not view the decision as an imposition upon legislatures;
but rather an evaluation of legislative policy which had placed discretionary
power in the hands of juries.00 "[Tihat policy of vesting sentencing au-
thority primarily in juries-a decision largely motivated by the desire to miti-
gate the harshness of the law and to bring community judgment to bear on
the sentence as well as guilt or innocence-has so effectively achieved its
aims that capital punishment within the confines of the statutes now before
us has for all practical purposes run its course."'0
7
Dissent
Although the four dissenting Justices raise various rebuttals to the arguments
of the majority, 8 they are all united in the belief that if capital punishment is
to be eliminated at this late stage, it can only be done by popular sentiment
expressed by the public through their legislative representatives.
In addition to questioning the majority interpretation of the eighth amend-
ment language, 9 Chief Justice Burger disagreed that there were obvious in-
dications of public rejection of capital punishment. He pointed out that
65. Id. at 310.
66. Id. at 314.
67. Id. at 313.
68. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist filed dissent-
ing opinions.
69. Chief Justice Burger reprimanded Justices White and Stewart for using essen-
tially a due process argument, in lieu of eighth amendment considerations for which
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new capital crimes have been sanctioned in recent years, 70 that polls cer-
tainly do not show strong public demand to eliminate capital punishment,71
nor are death sentences meted out so rarely as the majority indicates. 72
Further, he contended, judges are incompetent to measure something so
elusive as a "shift in public values" if it did occur, while the legislatures were
designed for that purpose. 73  Although troubled by the majority's reasoning,
the Chief Justice admitted that he is "not altogether displeased that legisla-
tive bodies have been given the opportunity, and indeed the unavoidable re-
sponsibility, to make a thorough re-evaluation of the entire subject of capital
punishment. '74
In a more personal opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun began with a statement
of his own abhorence for capital punishment but refused to let that dictate
what he believed to be his judicial duty. He chided the majority for taking
"the easy choice" morally in striking down the death penalty when in fact
such a decision should be based only on legislative rather than judicial rea-
soning.75 His reading of prior case law lead him only to the conclusion that
the courts, the legislatures and the people have long accepted capital punish-
ment and he saw no significant movement or shift in values that would sud-
denly make the death penalty offensive to contemporary moral standards. 70
He indicated that the majority was swayed by the California Court's decision
in Anderson, when in fact that case should have no bearing on this Court's
decision.
Blackmun pointed to recent overwhelming votes in Congress which es-
tablished new capital crimes and indicated that the majority was unjustified
in considering itself more in touch with contemporary moral standards than
certiorari was granted in this case. Burger contended there is no empirical evidence
to indicate that juries are not exercising their good faith responsibility in choosing be-
tween life and death according to community values. To allege otherwise, he believed,
was to cast grave doubt upon the integrity of the jury system. Id. at 389 n.12.
In any case, Burger maintained the consideration of such due process arguments are
foreclosed by the recent McGautha decision which the majority is attempting to cir-
cumvent or indirectly overrule. Id. at 398-40.
70. In the last eleven years Congress has declared four new offenses as capital
crimes by overwhelming votes. id. at 385 and accompanying footnote.
71. Id. at 385-86 n.9.
72. There is some evidence to indicate that 15-20% of those convicted of murder
are sentenced to death. Id. at 386 n.ll.
73. Id. at 383.
74. Id. at 403. Chief Justice Burger hoped that new legislative consideration of
the death penalty will generate more conclusive evidence of its application and effect
than that relied upon by the majority in this case. Id. at 405.
At the same time Burger and Justice Blackmun shared concern that the majority
ruling will only encourage the return of mandatory death statutes.
75. Id. at 410.
76. Id. at 408.
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those elected representatives. 77  Like Burger, Blackmun personally ap-
proved the result but believed the Court far overstepped its authority to reach
it.
Justice Powell registered strong objection to the majority's abandonment
of case-by-case evaluation of eighth amendment punishments in favor of
such a sweeping elimination of virtually all death penalties.78 He, too, of-
fered evidence of public opinion polls and legislative votes which, he be-
lieved, clearly indicated a desire to retain the death penalty in some states.79
Powell contended that any attempt to estimate social standards, given all the
conflicting evidence, was pure speculation and certainly not the function of
the Court.80 In a closing plea for judicial restraint Powell stated:
I know of no case in which greater gravity and delicacy have at-
tached to the duty (of judicial restraint) that this Court is called on
to perform whenever legislation-state or federal-is challenged on
constitutional grounds. It seems to me that the sweeping judicial
action taken today reflects a basic lack of faith and confidence in the
democratic process. Many may regret, as I do, the failure of some
legislative bodies to address the capital punishment issue with
greater frankness or effectiveness. Many might decry their failure
either to abolish the penalty entirely or selectively, or to establish
standards for its enforcement. But impatience with the slowness,
and even the unresponsiveness, of legislatures is no justification for
judicial intrusion upon their historic powers. 81
Justice Rehnquist cast his vote with the dissents of Justices Blackmun and
Powell, and added his own admonition of the majority for what he believed
was an unwarranted invasion of the legislative domain. Although the very
nature of the constitutional system of checks and balances gives the judiciary
the last word in interpreting and applying constitutional principles, he
reminded the majority, such power carries with it the implied obligation that
the judiciary exercise self-restraint. He cautioned that such self-restraint is
particularly critical in instances where duly enacted legislation is challenged
and added that "[t]he task of judging constitutional cases . . . must surely
be approached with the deepest humility and genuine deference to legislative
judgment."
Rehnquist believed such deference was appropriate in an issue such as
capital punishment where judges are strongly moved by their own personal
convictions:
77. Id. at 413.
78. Id. at 433-34.
79. Id. at 437-39.
80. Id. at 443-44.
81. Id. at 464-65.
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Rigorous attention to the limits of the Court's authority is like-
wise enjoined because of the natural desire that beguiles judges
along with other human beings into imposing their own views of
goodness, truth, and justice upon others. . . . The most expan-
sive reading of the leading constitutional cases does not remotely
suggest that this Court has been granted a roving commission...
to strike down laws that are based upon notions of policy or moral-
ity suddenly found unacceptable by a majority of this Court. 2
In addition, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority decision as another
serious encroachment by the federal courts, under the banner of fourteenth
amendment rights, upon the constitutional rights of the States to govern
themselves. He viewed capital punishment statutes as laws duly enacted by
elected legislators in legitimate attempts to deal with serious crimes in their
states, and as such deserved to stand even against the claims of individuals
under the due process and equal protection clauses. 8
Conclusion
The Furman decision had the immediate effect of sparing the lives of over
six hundred capital offenders awaiting execution and virtually suspending the
imposition of new death sentences pending future legislation. But the case
left unanswered the ultimate question of the constitutionality of capital
punishment per se. It must be reiterated that the only common ground
among the majority opinions is that the discretionary imposition of death sen-
tences by juries had resulted in such infrequent and uneven use as to consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment to those upon whom it was inflicted.
The decision does not affect the handful of statutes imposing mandatory
death sentences,8 4 nor does it preclude the possibility that the more widely
used discretionary system could be cured of its constitutional defects.
Since the Furman decision was announced there has been a flurry of ac-
tivity on state and federal levels to reinstate capital punishment to whatever
degree possible.8, Some supporters advocate a return to the broader use of
mandatory death sentences for the most serious crimes, arguing that this ap-
proach would avoid the possibility of uneven or discriminatory use con-
82. Id. at 467.
83. Id. at 470, citing Black, J., in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126 (1970).
84. See statutes cited note 3 supra as exceptions.
85. On November 7, 1972, the voters of California passed a referendum by a two-to-
one margin calling for reinstatement of the death penalty in the form of an amendment
to the state constitution in light of the Anderson decision. The procedure amounts
only to a formal registration of public sentiment and is not itself binding legislation.
A current survey of state legislatures showed that of the 47 legislatures presently in
session, nine had abolished the death penalty (all prior to the Furman decision), but
31 of the remaining 38 states had legislation pending to reinstate capital punishment and
Florida had already restored the penalty.
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demned in Furman. However, as the Court recognized both in Furman and
McGautha, the move away from mandatory death penalties in recent history
to allowing juries the discretion to choose between life and death came
about as a result of juries refusing to convict defendants, regardless of guilt,
whom they felt did not deserve to die.8 A return, then, to mandatory sen-
tences could thwart the fundamental purposes of criminal justice by forcing
sympathetic juries to let capital offenders go completely unpunished. Such
use of capital punishment would further contribute to an uneven pattern of
convictions and executions because it would serve to increase pressure on
prosecutors to reduce charges in order to secure convictions and on governors
to commute unpopular sentences.
On the other hand, any attempt to reform the discretionary infliction of
death sentences by providing standards to "guide" juries in their choice of
sentences also poses problems. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out, past at-
tempts to draw up standards that would be both acceptable to lawmakers
and meaningful to lay jurors have been failures.8 7
One proposal under consideration by the staff of the Department of Justice
would provide a two-stage trial system with a "mandatory" characteristic. In
federal cases the jury would first determine the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant charged with a capital offense. A guilty verdict would require a
subsequent proceeding where the jury would hear evidence of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances before passing sentence. An instruction
would then be given the jurors that they are required to impose the death
penalty if they find certain factors present, such as "a willful disregard for
human life" by the defendant. However, there is little reason to believe that
the discretion given the jury under such a system, even with "guides," would
produce a less arbitrary pattern of death sentences than the "unguided" sys-
tem struck down in Furman. Generally-worded guides would probably en-
compass the kind of considerations jurors weigh in their own minds anyway
when confronted with the life or death choice.88
86. See 408 U.S. at 339 (Marshall opinion) and 402 (Burger dissent, citing the
Court's review in McGautha).
87. Id. at 387. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger wrote, "Unless the Court in Mc-
Gautha misjudged the experience of history, there is little reason to believe that sen-
tencing standards in any form will substantially alter the discretionary character of the
prevailing system of sentencing in capital cases." Id. at 401. See also, McGautha for
the Court's review of the practical difficulties in framing manageable jury instruc-
tions for capital punishment. 402 U.S. 183, 197-208 (1971).
88. At a press conference held in Washington, D.C., on January 4, 1973, Attorney
General Richard Kleindienst announced his own support for reinstatement of manda-
tory death sentences in cases involving "cold blooded and premeditated" acts of vio-
lence (e.g, the killing of a prison guard by a life term prisoner, the killing of a police-
man, the assassination of a public official, skyjacking and the bombing of a public
building). However, the department's staff is expected to recommend to Congress the
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The Florida legislature made a more innovative attempt to correct the
constitutional defects cited in Furman. With the passage of a law on De-
cember 1, 1972,89 the state installed a two-stage trial system for capital
crimes, but the jury's duty in the second stage is only to recommend punish-
ment. The final decision rests in the sole discretion of the judge, who is
required to file a written report stating the factors involved in his choice of a
life or death sentence. The object of the reports is to create what will
amount to a body of sentencing case law which hopefully will produce
some consistency in the use of the death penalty and to provide a record for
the state supreme court to review in an automatic appeal of any death sen-
tence.90 If capital punishment survives at all, it seems likely that this type of
approach would be the most attractive alternative.
While legislative activity to reinstate capital punishment remains in the
formative stages, several developments can be expected. First, future im-
position of death sentences, whether under a mandatory or a discretionary
system, will spawn new appeals to the Supreme Court. Adversaries of cap-
ital punishment will push for a conclusive ruling against the death penalty
per se, or, at the very least, try to upset each of its various forms. Second, de-
spite reenactment and use of capital punishment statutes, the moratorium
on executions can be expected to remain in effect until a clearer resolution of
the penalty's constitutionality is provided by the Court.
It is difficult to predict in which direction the Court will move in subse-
quent considerations of the death penalty. 91 The limited decision in Fur-
man was achieved by the barest of majorities. At the same time, the Fur-
man majority must be conscious of the fact that their reading of the "evolv-
ing standards of decency which mark the progress" of our matured society
appears to be curiously at odds with the opinions of a large and vocal seg-
ment of the population and their elected representatives. The majority
opinions leave themselves open to the dissenters' oft repeated charges that
enactment of the more discretionary two-stage trial system. The Washington Post,
January 6, 1973, § A, at 6, col. 7.
89. 1 F.S.A. Sess. Laws 1972, ch. 72-724. The bill was passed by the Florida House
by a vote of 116-2 and by the Florida Senate by 36-1. It arose as a compromise when
the legislators became deadlocked over the manner of sentencing.
90. The Florida law is also unique in that seldom if ever in the past have judges
been required to justify the severity of a sentence which was within their discretion to
impose. It will be interesting, if this legislation survives constitutional challenge, to
see if this concept remains limited to capital crimes or is expanded into a more general
principle in criminal sentencing.
91. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall are on record as advocating the total aboli-
tion of the death penalty. Justices Douglas, White and Stewart expressly reserved
judgment on that issue. Although dissenting in the case, Chief Justice Burger indi-
cated that he might find that mandatory death sentences "without the intervening and
ameliorating impact of lay jurors, are so arbitrary and doctrinaire that they violate the
Constitution." 408 U.S. at 402.
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